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I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I examine the Canadian system of regulation of
corporate takeover defenses with reference to the American system.
This comparison involves: first, an investigation and survey of the
structure of Canadian securities law; second, an analysis of Canada’s
jurisprudence surrounding takeover defenses and its underlying
philosophy of regulation; and third, a proposal to modify the Canadian
system based on a brief analysis of the American system. This article
proposes that Canada should place more trust in the shareholder
franchise and should limit the ability of its regulators to interfere with a
board’s exercise of its fiduciary duties in a takeover situation.
Canada’s business corporation statutes protect shareholders much
more effectively than their U.S. equivalents do. As a result,
shareholders can better discipline their agents when those agents do not
adequately serve their interests. These statutory protections complement
Canada’s well-developed body of corporate common law governing the
fiduciary duties of directors in takeover situations and otherwise.
Directors’ fiduciary duties require them to take certain considerations
into account in takeover situations; where directors fail to fulfill their
fiduciary duties, shareholders can discipline them in court.
However, directors currently receive conflicting directives from
Canadian courts and Canadian securities commissions. Securities
commissions are empowered to intervene in takeover bids to impose
duties of their own devise on directors. These securities law duties
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reflect different priorities than those articulated by courts holding on
matters of common law fiduciary duty. This conflict creates confusion
that is undesirable and untenable.
Instead, Canada should adopt a more hands-off regulatory climate
with regard to boards in takeover situations. Canada should trust in the
application of well-established control mechanisms—specifically, the
shareholder franchise and fiduciary duties as interpreted by Canadian
courts and prosecuted by shareholders—to constrain the board while
respecting its important management role according to traditional
corporation theory.
II. ANALYSIS
1. Structural Overview of Canada’s System of Securities
Regulation
a. Introduction: Goals of the System
The purpose of the Canadian regulatory system is to protect
investors and to promote efficiency in the capital markets. Specifically,
the system’s objective is “to protect investors from fraudulent,
manipulative or misleading practices,” “to ensure investors have fair
access to market facilities and market or price information,” and “to
reduce the risk of failure of market intermediaries and when it cannot be
avoided. . .seek to reduce the impact on investors and other market
1
participants.” These goals are reflected in the statutes that form the
2
basis for Canada’s securities law.
But these goals are compromised by the structure of the regulatory
system. As a matter of Canadian constitutional law, the ten provinces
and three territories historically have been accorded independent
authority over securities regulation under the provincial “property and
3
civil rights” power. And, unlike in the U.S., each securities commission
has direct and substantive jurisdiction over boards in takeover situations
in addition to the jurisdiction traditionally exercised by common law
courts. This fragmented and disjointed regulatory system has led to
1

William S. Rice, Introduction to the Canadian Securities Administrators, CANADIAN
SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS, (Mar. 3, 2010), available at http://www.securitiesadministrators.ca/our-mission.aspx.
2
See, e.g., Securities Act (Ontario), R.S.O. 1990, ch. S.5 (“OSA”), § 1.1 (Can.).
3
Lymburn v. Mayland, [1932] 1 W.W.R. 578 Olms. (Can.).
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confusion regarding basic securities law policy—both as between
jurisdictions and among market participants. As between jurisdictions,
it allows for divergence in application of supposedly national policies
that causes uncertainty in Canada’s capital markets. For market
participants, it creates an environment of potentially conflicting
directives from the judicial branch and the administrative branch.
b. A Fragmented System
i. Securities law defined, jurisdiction by jurisdiction
Securities regulation in Canada is an American federalist’s dream
come true. Unlike in the U.S., Canada does not have a securities
regulatory authority at the federal government level. There is no
Canadian equivalent of the SEC, and the Supreme Court of Canada (the
“SCC”) recently held that such a national regulator would be
4
unconstitutional. Instead, each of Canada’s thirteen jurisdictions has its
own securities commission constituted by a separate enabling statute,
that province’s Securities Act. The body of securities law in each
province consists of (i) the Act, (ii) the legally binding rules and
regulations promulgated by the commissions under that Act, and
(iii) nonbinding policies including the decisions of the commissions
interpreting the statute and the rules and regulations with respect to a
5
particular person or company. Provincial securities commissions are
responsible for monitoring and enforcing the standards imposed on
registrants by securities law so defined and by stock exchange rules (if
6
one exists in the province). But unlike the SEC, Canadian securities
commissions’ purview includes enforcement of certain substantive
policies that in the American system would be governed by state
corporate law, such as the regulation of takeover defences. In other
words, securities law in Canada governs more than mere disclosure
obligations: a Canadian securities commission also will initiate an
enforcement action with regard to an issuer based on the broad and
ambiguous “public interest jurisdiction” that each of Canada’s securities
7
statutes grants to its securities commission.
4
Reference re Securities Act, [2011] SCC 66 (Can.), available at
http://scc.lexum.org/en/2011/2011scc66/2011scc66.html .
5
OSA § 1(1) (“Ontario securities law”) (Can.).
6
BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP, SEC. LAW & PRACTICE §INT 9.1 — Purposes of the Act
(3d ed. 2011).
7
See, e.g., OSA § 127(1) (Can.) (“The Commission may make one or more of the
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Enforcement decisions may be rendered after an administrative
hearing before a commission. Parties to the hearing then may appeal the
8
commission’s decision to that province’s or territory’s trial court or
9
court of appeal. The commissions are bound by the orders of the
10
judicial courts specified in the statute, but are not bound by the
11
decisions of other securities commissions or even their own decisions.
These enforcement proceedings produce bodies of prior decisions in
each province equivalent to policy statements by an administrative
agency in the United States: the prior decisions of a given provincial
securities commission guide but do not bind that commission (or any
other). As a practical matter, the securities regulators interpret
precedent—their own and that of other provinces—much as state courts
would interpret case law. However, while Ontario and British Columbia
generally are considered the leading jurisdictions in terms of securities
law, there is not the same level of convergence as that which has
12
occurred around Delaware law in the United States.
This jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction autonomy also extends to
enforcement of the securities laws, substantive and otherwise. The
thirteen securities commissions each have different powers and
sanctions, and different levels of resources to devote to the various
regulatory tasks that they are charged with. Accordingly,
13
“[e]nforcement varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.” Moreover, the
fragmented multi-party nature of the system makes investigation of
securities law violations in multiple jurisdictions inherently more
difficult. Coordination of such complex investigations is procedurally
challenging, and there is less direct accountability and therefore less
inclination and political capital for any one jurisdiction to expend

following orders if in its opinion it is in the public interest to make the order or orders . . .
.”)(emphasis added).
8
See, e.g., OSA § 9(1).
9
See, e.g., Securities Act (British Columbia), R.S.B.C. 1996, ch. 418 (“BCSA”), § 167
(Can.); Securities Act (Saskatchewan), S.S. 1988-89, ch. S–42.2, § 11(1) (Can.).
10
See, e.g., OSA § 61(8).
11
See, e.g., BCSA § 167.5(1) (“Subject to the regulations, the commission may, by
order, adopt or incorporate by reference all or any provisions of any extraprovincial
securities laws . . . .”) (emphasis added).
12
Cf. ANDREW KITCHING, SECURITIES REGULATION: CALLS FOR A SINGLE REGULATOR 8,
PRB 08–38E
(Library of Parliament (Can.), (Feb. 16, 2009), available at
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0838-e.htm .
13
Id. at 9.
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ii. Stock exchanges
Regulatory oversight of Canada’s capital markets is equally
balkanised. A different regulator oversees each of Canada’s three main
15
stock exchanges. The Ontario Securities Commission (“OSC”) is the
lead regulator for the Toronto Stock Exchange, Canada’s senior equity
16
market and its largest and most active stock exchange. The Alberta
Securities Commission (“ASC”) and the British Columbia Securities
Commission (“BCSC”) jointly are the lead regulators for the TSX
Venture Exchange, a public venture capital marketplace for emerging
17
companies. Quebec’s Autorité des marchés financiers is the lead
regulator for the Bourse de Montréal, Canada’s derivatives exchange
that trades futures contracts and options on equities, indices, currencies,
18
exchange-traded funds, energy, and interest rates. These three
exchanges all are owned by TMX Group, Inc., located in Toronto,
19
Ontario.
Piecemeal regulation of these three arms of a single entity (TMX
Group, Inc.) has several negative consequences. First, the system faces
obvious economies of scope that could be realised by consolidating
basic common administrative functions. Failure to realise these
economies of scope necessarily increases transaction costs for all parties
involved. Second, regulation by multiple smaller and more local
regulators increases the vulnerability of the regulatory system to capture
by special interests. Factions potentially can affect a disproportionate
14
Cf. Stephan P. Sonnenberg, Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School, Lecture to
Negotiation Workshop B1 at Harvard Law School: Multiparty Negotiations (Mar. 3, 2011);
see also Kitching, supra note 12, at 9.
15
Rice, supra note 1.
16
“OSC | Marketplaces, SROs & Clearing Agencies – Exchanges”, Ontario Securities
Commission, available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Marketplaces_exchanges_index.htm
(last accessed March 23, 2012); “OSC | Marketplaces, SROs & Clearing Agencies –
Exchanges – TMX Group Inc. and TSX Inc.”, Ontario Securities Commission, available at
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Marketplaces_tmx-tsx_index.htm (last accessed March 23,
2012).
17
“About
ASC”,
Alberta
Securities
Commission,
available
at
http://www.albertasecurities.com/about/Pages/default.aspx (last accessed March 23, 2012).
18
“Montréal
Exchange | Regulation”,
TMX Inc.,
http://reg.mx.ca/en/about/mission_roles (“Under the AMF oversight…”) (last accessed March 23,
2012).
19
TMX Group Inc. Corporate Profile, TMX Group Inc. (2010), available at
http://www.tmx.com/en/pdf/TMXGroupCorporateProfile.pdf.
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influence over the regulatory policy applicable to their exchange. And
third, oversight by multiple regulators reduces the efficiency with which
the overall system manages systemic risk. Diffuse loci of regulation
means that systemic risk associated with the individual stock exchanges
could in the aggregate be sufficient to bring down the nation’s capital
markets. Moreover, it might be more socially or economically optimal
to allow a certain overall level of systemic risk, allocation of which
could be better determined by a single regulator rather than by multiple
regulators each of whom might over- or under-regulate in the aggregate.
c. Attempts at Unity
Canada’s securities commissions have taken some steps to mitigate
this regulatory cacophony. For one, each commission delegates certain
regulatory responsibilities, including with regard to Canada’s
exchanges, to self-regulatory organizations with national scope, such as
the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada and the
20
Mutual Fund Dealers Association. But more importantly, in 2003,
Canada’s provincial and territorial securities commissions formally
organized into the Canadian Securities Administrators (“CSA”), a
21
voluntary umbrella organization. The CSA’s stated objective is “to
improve, coordinate and harmonize regulation of the Canadian capital
22
markets.” This attempt at harmony through the CSA has taken two
principal forms: (i) practical reciprocity–based, by means of the
“passport system,” and (ii) regulatory coordination–based, by means of
adoption of common rules and regulations. However, the attempts are
largely ineffective in achieving true regulatory harmony. As a practical
matter, the problem with voluntary cooperation is that any ostensibly
national policy can be undone any time a CSA member province
unilaterally changes its policy.

20

BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP, SEC. LAW & PRACTICE §INT 9.1 — Purposes of the Act
(3d ed. 2011).
21
“Provincial securities regulators have been getting together for a number of years.
[Their] first meetings can be traced back to the beginning of the 1930s. The CSA was restructured in September 2003 into a more formal organization.” E-mail from CSA
Secretariat to Ian Wildgoose Brown (Apr. 13, 2011)) (on file with author).
22
Rice, supra note 1, at 5.
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i. Practical reciprocity–based collaboration
Under the passport system, a market participant’s registration with
one commission effectively is given full faith and credit by
commissions in the other participating jurisdictions. For example, the
Nova Scotia Securities Commission will consider an issuer who
successfully registers with the Saskatchewan Securities Commission to
be registered under Nova Scotia securities law. The program’s intention
is to allow market participants to have access to markets in all Canadian
23
jurisdictions but deal only with their principal regulator.
However, “most stakeholders” (apart from the CSA itself) feel that
the application of the passport system “is limited and it still falls short
24
of what is required in today’s global marketplace.” The program is
voluntary, and Ontario (Canada’s most populous province and home to
25
Toronto, its largest economic hub) is not a participating jurisdiction.
Some market participants believe that the passport system, which
requires virtual unanimity among provinces and territories, is “[too]
26
slow to respond to new policy requirements as they arise.” Moreover,
“a company wishing to raise money across Canada still may be required
27
to pay fees to 13 jurisdictions,” and be required to continue dealing
with thirteen separate bureaucracies. These hurdles impose transaction
costs on market participants trying to invest in Canada’s capital markets
and potential systemic risk management issues on the capital markets as
a whole.

23
Id. at 7; see also Regulatory Cooperation – Pan-Canadian, CANADIAN SECURITIES
ADMINISTRATORS,
http://www.securities-administrators.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=96
(last
visited Apr. 11, 2011).
24
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE HON. THOMAS HOCKIN, P.C. ET AL.,
EXPERT PANEL ON SECURITIES REGULATION, TO THE HON. JIM FLAHERTY, P.C., M.P., MINISTER
OF FINANCE (CAN.) at 2 (Jan. 12, 2009) (“Final Report”), available at www.expertpanel.ca.
25
Rice, supra note 1, at 7. Instead, the OSC makes its own decisions taking into
consideration the decision of the applicant’s principal regulator. All other Canadian
jurisdictions treat OSC decisions as definitive as though governed by the passport system.
26
Kitching, supra note 12, at 8.
27
Id. at 7 (quoting Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP, Singing the Passport Blues:
Perfect
Harmony
Eludes
Provincial
Securities
Harmonization
Efforts,
4 MARKETCAPS @ GOWLINGS (Mar. 14, 2008)).
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ii. Regulatory coordination–based collaboration.
The CSA also acts as a forum for coordinating regulatory
28
collaboration among Canada’s thirteen securities regulators. This
collaboration ultimately takes the form of instruments and policies
governing both technical or procedural and substantive aspects of
securities law. The instruments and policies are adopted either
nationally (i.e., by all securities commissions) or multilaterally (i.e., by
29
multiple but not all securities commissions). Instruments are adopted
as rules by participating securities commissions; a given instrument,
30
therefore, has the force of law in each jurisdiction that adopts it.
Policies are adopted as “guidelines” for market participants regarding a
securities commission’s “perspective” on the subject of the policy; a
given policy informs the commission’s enforcement of securities laws
31
in its jurisdiction.
CSA members’ staff draft both instruments and policies
collaboratively, but each proposed instrument or policy must pass a
32
notice and comment period in each jurisdiction. Each then must be
approved separately by each minister responsible for overseeing
33
administration of his jurisdiction’s securities law. This problem is
compounded by the fact that thirteen securities commissions then
independently interpret, apply, and enforce each supposedly national
component of the system.
The nature of this regulatory collaboration based process has two
negative effects. First, similar to the passport program, its voluntary
nature creates opportunities for individual jurisdictions to except
themselves from a given instrument or policy. The result is an
institutionalized acceptance of disparate regulation and standards across
the country. Second, its decentralized nature slows the adoption of
national rules and policies. The potential for delays seriously inhibits
28
Cf. Securities Law & Instruments – Instruments, Rules & Policies, ONTARIO
SECURITIES COMMISSION, http://osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_irps_index.htm (last
visited Apr. 11, 20011).
29
See, e.g., Notice of National Policy 62-202 and Rescission of National Policy
Statement No. 38: Take-Over Bids – Defensive Tactics, ONTARIO SECURITIES COMMISSION,
(effective Aug. 4, 1997), http://osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_pol_19970704_62202_fnp.jsp (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).
30
Telephone Interview with an Enquiries Officer, OSC (Mar. 2, 2011).
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
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34

efficient regulation of Canada’s capital markets. According to an
expert panel convened in 2009 by the federal government (“Expert
Panel”), Canada’s system is “too slow, too cumbersome, and too
35
expensive.” The Expert Panel pointed out that “[a]t a time when speed
counts, policy development is protracted, negatively affecting Canada’s
ability to respond in a timely manner to national and global
36
developments.”
iii. Underlying tensions
A fragmented system with a voluntary umbrella organization like
the CSA makes securities regulation a chip in a larger federal-system
negotiation game. The multi-party nature of the system stifles efficient
37
substantive negotiation. It increases transaction costs associated with
passing multijurisdictional instruments and policies. Additionally, the
multi-party nature allows each province’s political system to have a
separate voice and an effective veto on any unified national policy,
rendering negotiation multidimensional and therefore more difficult.
In general, where “there’s an audience behind [the negotiator] . . .
38
value-creation [becomes] harder.” In the context of Canada’s federal
government structure, where each party must answer to its own home
jurisdiction, a comingling of securities regulation and federal politics
allows federation-related concerns unrelated to securities law to seep
into negotiations regarding even the relatively apolitical aspects of the
system. “Longstanding disputes” can poison the negotiating
39
atmosphere. In the Canadian context, any agreement must be struck in
the shadow of other inter-jurisdictional federal politics. As a result,
“principled options generation becomes more risky”, and “it is more
40
difficult to resolve even simple issues.” These concerns compound the
34
Id. (describing adoption of National Instrument 31-103, proposed in Feb. 2007 and
adopted in Sept. 2009 only after two notice and comment rounds).
35
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE HON. THOMAS HOCKIN, P.C. ET
AL., EXPERT PANEL ON SECURITIES REGULATION, TO THE HON. JIM FLAHERTY, P.C., M.P.,
MINISTER OF FINANCE (CAN.) at 2 (2009) (“Final Report”), available at www.expertpanel.ca.
36
Id.
37
The following discussion is based on Stephan P. Sonnenberg, Lecturer on Law,
Harvard Law School, Lecture to Negotiation Workshop B1 at Harvard Law School:
Multiparty Negotiations ( Mar. 3, 2011).
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
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problems that plague the attempts to forge regulatory unity on an ad hoc
basis described above.
d. National Securities Regulator
Canada’s securities system has withstood many bouts of advocacy
41
for a national securities regulator. Commentators and commissions
repeatedly have asserted that a common securities regulator is “the only
way of promoting timely enforcement of securities laws and eliminating
42
overlap and confusion” among Canada’s jurisdictions. The federal
government acted on this succession of expert opinions and drafted a
national Securities Act in 2010. On April 13 and 14, 2011, the SCC
43
heard arguments on the constitutionality of the Act. This legislative
activity marked a strong move toward a national securities regulator, a
move that could have begun to address the jurisdictional conflicts and
confusion that currently characterize Canadian securities law. However,
as noted above, the SCC held in an advisory opinion that the Act was
44
unconstitutional as drafted.
A detailed consideration of the benefits of a national securities
regulator is beyond the scope of this paper. However, and
notwithstanding the opinion of the SCC, the arguments in favor of such
a regulator seem to be grounded in market efficiency and protection of
investors and other market participants, whereas the arguments against
seem to be grounded in petty interprovincial politics and local economic
entrenchment motives.
Moreover, the continued regulatory
fragmentation that the SCC decision leaves untouched has an insidious
impact on the regulation of takeover defenses.

41
REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON BANKING AND FINANCE (the “Porter
Commission Report”) (1964); REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON
SECURITIES LEGISLATION IN ONTARIO TO LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (the “Kimber Report”)
(1965).
42
Kitching, supra note 12, at 9.; see also MICHAEL E.J. PHELPS, CHAIR, WISE PERSON’S
COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE STRUCTURE OF SECURITIES REGULATION IN CANADA, DEPT. OF
FINANCE CANADA, IT’S TIME (Dec. 17, 2003), available at www.wise-averties.ca;
CRAWFORD PANEL ON A SINGLE CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATOR, MINISTRY OF
GOVERNMENT SERVICES, BLUEPRINT FOR A CANADIAN SECURITIES COMMISSION: FINAL PAPER
(2006), available at www.cba.ca/contents/files/misc/msc_crawfordreport_en.pdf.
43
Nigel Campbell & Doug McLeod, Supreme Court Hears Arguments on National
Securities Regulator, 2011–04 LITIGATION & DISPUTE RESOLUTION BULLETIN 1 (Apr. 2011),
available at http://www.blakes.com/english/view_bulletin.asp?ID=4711.
44
Reference re Securities Act, supra note 4.
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2. Substantive Overview of Canada’s Regulation of Takeover
Defenses
Both the fragmented structure of Canada’s securities law system
and the active role that Canada’s provincial securities commissions play
in policing boards of directors in takeover situations contrast sharply
with the American model of securities regulation. In the United States,
securities law is governed federally by the SEC. The SEC’s mandate
under the Securities Act of 1933 (known as the “‘33 Act”) and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (known as the “‘34 Act”) is for the
45
most part a regime based on disclosure. The only truly substantive
work that those Acts do is to protect against insider trading and short46
swing profits. It is the state courts that govern substantive corporate
law including the law of takeover defenses.
The American system seems incoherent in a Canadian sense
because the corporate law applicable in a given lawsuit depends on the
implicated corporation’s state of incorporation. Whatever court, state or
federal, is presiding over a given case must apply that state’s corporate
law. For instance, Delaware follows the shareholder supremacy model
47
outlined in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. but
Pennsylvania ostensibly follows a “stakeholder” model that is even
48
more explicit than that mandated by Canadian corporate law.
However, the potential for incoherence in American corporate law
49
is mitigated by two factors. First, most corporations are based in
Delaware, and so most corporate law–related suits are brought in
Delaware. This convergence on Delaware is based both on inertia
(holdover from the regulatory “race to the bottom” of the nineteenth
century) and on a regard for a state court judiciary generally considered
expert in corporate law matters. Second, Wall Street essentially defaults
45

Michael Wiseman, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Presentation at the Harvard Business
Law Review Symposium (Apr. 2, 2011).
46
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1934) (known as § 16(b) of the ‘34 Act) and 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1951).
47
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The shareholder supremacy model’s supremacy is
debatable in light of subsequent Delaware jurisprudence.
48
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715 (“Exercise of powers generally”) (1995); see Re
BCE Inc., [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (Can.) (articulating a strong stakeholder model of fiduciary
duties for Canadian boards of directors; discussed infra).
49
Mark Gordon, Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz LLP, Lecture to the Mergers &
Acquisitions Workshop at Harvard Law School: Deal Protection and Topping Bids (Jan.
10, 2011).
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to a Delaware law standard in assessing any board’s actions regardless
of the individual corporation’s state of incorporation. This decision
seems to be based similarly on inertia, given Wall Street’s familiarity
with Delaware law. As a result, directors typically follow the Delaware
“shareholders first” jurisprudence for reputational reasons: directors
want to be selected as directors of other companies in the future, and
Wall Street’s judgment has enormous influence—both explicit and
implicit—in those determinations.
This level of de facto unity does not exist to the same extent in
Canada. Though Toronto unequivocally is Canada’s business capital,
companies are incorporated across Canada and decisions by any
securities commission can affect the country’s business landscape.
Although Canadian courts have built a robust body of corporate law to
inform directors’ decisions regarding the corporation that shareholders
entrust to them, Canada’s securities commissions arrogate to themselves
decisions regarding the manner in which directors fulfill their fiduciary
duties in practice. As discussed below, variation across jurisdiction at
the edges of takeover defense jurisprudence, and potential conflict
between substantive corporate law and substantive securities law,
causes uncertainty and tension that is inefficient and undesirable.
At a broader level, despite better protection of the shareholder
franchise, Canada is more restrictive of the board’s use of takeover
defenses such as a shareholder rights plan (“SRP”). This restrictive
stance that Canadian securities law has allowed its securities
commissions to adopt has two negative consequences. First,
systemically undermining a board’s ability to erect effective takeover
defenses means that hostile takeovers in Canada are too easy. Given that
a transaction of some kind almost inevitably occurs as soon as the first
bid is made, more M&A activity occurs than is optimal. Second,
undermining existing corporate law constraints on boards in the name of
some version—one unitary vision—of shareholder interest undermines
board management authority. This grant of authority to the board is the
foundation of corporate common law. It should not be revoked lightly.
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a. Introduction: Sources of Law
National Policy 62-202 – Takeover Bids – Defensive Tactics
articulates the two principles that underlie Canadian securities law
50
relating to takeover defenses. First, Canada has determined that
unrestricted auctions produce the most desirable results in takeover bid
51
situations. Second, Canada has determined that shareholders of the
target of a hostile bid generally should be free to make a fully informed
52
decision to determine the ultimate outcome of that bid.
Regulation of takeover defenses by Canadian securities
commissions historically has followed these two principles.
53
Accordingly, the target’s board may use defensive tactics (e.g., a SRP )
in a genuine attempt to obtain a better bid—i.e., to create an auction to
improve the price that shareholders will receive for their shares.
However, tactics that are likely either to deny or to severely limit the
shareholders’ ability to respond to a takeover bid prompt securities
commissions to take sua sponte regulatory action against the target and
54
its board, or to accept an application by the hostile bidder. The
regulatory action typical in such circumstances is a “cease-trade” order
that freezes trading in shares of the target’s stock (or rights issued
55
pursuant to a SRP).

50

National Policy 62-202, Takeover Bids – Defensive Tactics, SEC. POLICY
65648519006
(into
force
Aug.
4,
1997),
available
at
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_pol_19970704_62-202_fnp.jsp (“NP 62-202”).
51
NP 62-202, § 1.1(5).
52
Re Canadian Jorex Ltd., [1992] 15 O.S.C. Bull. 257 (Can.), para. 16 (“[W]e have
every confidence that the shareholders of a target company will ultimately be quite able to
decide for themselves, with the benefit of the advice they receive from the target board and
others, including their own advisers, whether or not to dispose of their shares and, if so, at
what price and on what terms. And to us the public interest lies in allowing them to do just
that.”); see also David Surat & Paul A.D. Mingay, OSC allows shareholder rights plan to
stand, INTERNATIONAL LAW OFFICE: CORPORATE FINANCE/M&A – CANADA, July 8, 2009,
available
at
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Detail.aspx?r=18930&redir=1.
53
Ralph Shay, In Alberta and Now Ontario: There Comes a Time When a Poison Pill
Gets to Stay, 2009–06 SECURITIES NEWSLETTER 1–2 (June 2009). When the SRP first
arrived in Canada a few years after Martin Lipton invented it, securities commissions did
not employ National Policy 38 (predecessor to NP 62-202) to restrict their adoption by
Canadian companies.
54
NP 62-202, § 1.1(2), (5), (6); see also BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP, TAKE-OVER
BIDS AND ISSUER BIDS: DEFENCES TO UNFRIENDLY TAKE-OVER BIDS: NATIONAL POLICY 62202, SEC. LAW & PRACTICE § 20.23.2 (3d ed. 2011).
55
Shay, supra note 54.
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The commission’s regulatory action is based on the broad and
ambiguous “public interest jurisdiction” that each of Canada’s securities
56
statutes grants to its securities commission. This jurisdiction
effectively attaches at the commission’s discretion, even where there
57
has been no express violation of the securities laws. In such cases, the
commission applies the principles of the appropriate national policy,
ostensibly always prioritising the interests of shareholders; in cases of
potentially inappropriate takeover defenses, the commission looks to
58
NP 62-202. Commissions keep a close eye on situations where a target
board uses a SRP—corporate law’s most controversial takeover
59
defense.
b. Basic SRP Jurisprudence: Legal Framework
i. The OSC decides Canadian Jorex.
The OSC set the benchmark for treatment of the SRP in Re
Canadian Jorex Ltd., heard in December 1991. In its decision, the
Canadian Jorex panel stated that:
. . . the only question we really had to decide was whether the [SRP]
had served its purpose in facilitating an auction for Jorex, and so
ought to be discontinued as against the Mannville bid to let the
shareholders decide which bid they preferred (if, indeed they wished
to accept either one). All seemed to agree . . . that “there comes a
time when the pill has got to go.” The only real issue before us,
60
then . . . was “when does the pill go.”

The Canadian Jorex panel thereby acknowledged the two
principles underlying Canadian securities law relating to takeover
defenses employed by a target board. The board’s purpose in instituting
56
See, e.g., OSA § 127(1) (“The Commission may make one or more of the following
orders if in its opinion it is in the public interest to make the order or orders . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
57
Ralph Shay, Take-over Defences and Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: Can National
Policy 62-202 and the BCE Decision Live Side by Side?, 2009–12 SECURITIES NEWSLETTER
1–2 (Dec. 2009); Telephone Interview with an Enquiries Officer, OSC (416-593-8314)
(Mar. 2, 2011, 14:03).
58
Interview with Enquiries Officer, supra note 47.
59
See Kevin J. Thomson et al., When “No” Means “Maybe”—the State of the “Just
Say No” Defence in Canada, THE 2011 LEXPERT/AMERICAN LAWYER GUIDE TO THE
LEADING
500
LAWYERS
IN
CANADA
A74
(2011),
available
at
www.dwpv.com/images/Article_-_When_No_Means_Maybe.pdf.
60
15 O.S.C. Bull. at para. 10.
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a SRP must be to “facilitat[e] an auction”; once the SRP has served this
purpose, it is time for the SRP “to go” and for the target shareholders to
61
decide. The notion that a SRP should expire, and that it should be the
securities commission that makes that determination, is the defining
feature of the Canadian Jorex decision. This feature set the course for
subsequent jurisprudence in Canada regarding takeover defenses in
general and SRPs in particular.
The panel based its pro-shareholder paradigm on a conception of
shareholders as sophisticated players in the capital markets. The panel
explicitly voiced its confidence in shareholders’ ability “to exercise one
of the fundamental rights of share ownership—the ability to dispose of
62
shares as one wishes.” The Canadian Jorex panel expressly rejected
the proposal that the decision whether a hostile bid is acceptable should
be left in the hands of the target board or its independent committee and
their professional advisors:
[W]e have every confidence that the shareholders of a target
company will ultimately be quite able to decide for themselves, with
the benefit of the advice they receive from the target board and
others, including their own advisers, whether or not to dispose of
their shares and, if so, at what price and on what terms. And to us the
63
public interest lies in allowing them to do just that.

Canada’s securities commissions historically followed the OSC’s
Canadian Jorex paradigm with respect to NP 62-202. Commissions
applied NP 62-202 consistently as against targets that instituted SRPs:
“In the roughly 20 cases from 1991 to 2007, the only unpredictable
aspect was the question of whether the pill would be cease traded
64
immediately or a few weeks hence.” This consistency is based in an
intent to apply a consistent interpretation of NP 62-202. Securities
commissions have recognized that the law informs the behavior of
market participants: “The rules of the game should be clear and
65
consistently applied to encourage bidders to come forward.”

61
62
63
64
65

Id.
Id. at para. 15.
Id. at para. 16.
Shay, supra note 54, at 1.
Re Cara Operations Ltd., [2002] 25 O.S.C. Bull. 7997, para. 58 (Can.).
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ii. Royal Host factors
Securities commissions have great flexibility and discretion in
66
analyzing a board’s conduct. But a result of securities commissions’
philosophy of consistency described above, case law interpreting
NP 62-202 in the context of a review of a SRP converged on a number
of factors that a commission considers in making its fact-specific
67
determination. These factors include, with regard to—
The company:



The size and complexity of the target company; and
Other defensive tactics, if any, implemented by the target
company.

The SRP:




When the SRP was adopted;
Whether shareholder approval of the SRP was obtained;
and
Whether there is broad shareholder support for the
continued operation of the SRP.

The bid:




66

The length of time since the bid was announced and made;
The nature of the bid, including whether it is coercive or
unfair to the shareholders of the target company; and
The likelihood that the bid will not be extended if the SRP
is not terminated.

Cf. Re Baffinland Iron Mines Corp., [2010] 33 O.S.C. Bull. 11385, para. 29 (Can.)
(“Notwithstanding the principles referred to above, at the end of the day, there is no one test
or consideration that constitutes the ‘holy grail’ when deciding whether a rights plan should
remain in place or be cease traded.”).
67
Re Royal Host Real Estate Investment Trust, [1999] 22 O.S.C. Bull. 7819, para. 69
(Can.) (joint decision with ASC and BCSC).

WILDGOOSE FORMATTED UPDATED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

314

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

6/28/2012 2:00 PM

Vol. 36:2

The market:




The steps taken by the target company to find an
alternative bid or transaction that would be better for the
shareholders;
The number of potential, viable offerors; and
The likelihood that, if given further time, the target
company will be able to find a better bid or transaction.

The Royal Host factors also track the two principles underlying
Canadian securities law relating to takeover defenses employed by a
target board. A board likely will be subject to regulatory action where
that board is well-protected by preclusive takeover defenses
(particularly those that have not been approved by the target’s
shareholders) and yet has not attempted to leverage those defenses to
initiate an auction or improve the original offer. In such circumstances,
a securities commission will intervene on behalf of the target’s
shareholders, basing its intervention on NP 62-202.
Securities commissions have applied more stringent scrutiny to
68
responsive defensive tactics. Conduct that is subjected to this more
stringent scrutiny includes so-called “tactical” SRPs (i.e., a SRP that is
“adopted by a target board in the face of a bid, without shareholder
69
approval”). Where a target board employs a tactical SRP in response to
a bid, the board must demonstrate to the commission that the SRP was
necessary “because of the coercive nature of the bid or some other very
70
substantial unfairness or impropriety.” The commission then weighs
the board’s arguments in light of the other Royal Host factors and
determines whether to cease-trade the rights issued pursuant to the SRP.
In short, the commission expressly shifts the business judgment burden
of proof from the shareholders to the board where the board uses a
tactical SRP. By contrast, Canadian courts respect the board’s business
judgment even where the target is in play: the duties of the target board
71
do not change.
68
See, e.g., Royal Host supra note 68 (considering the date the SRP was adopted
relative to the date of the bid).
69
Id. at para. 54.
70
Id. at para. 55 (quoting Re CW Shareholdings Inc. and WIC Western International
Communications Ltd., [1998] 21 O.S.C. Bull. 2899, 2908 (Can.)).
71
Pente Investment Management Ltd. v. Schneider Corp., [1998] 42 O.R.3d 177, para.
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This more stringent scrutiny is grounded in the express language of
72
NP 62-202. Application of this policy has created explicit incentives
73
for corporations to avoid “lame duck” defenses. More specifically, it
creates explicit incentives for a corporation to adopt a SRP and to have
it approved by its shareholders—both well in advance of a bid. This
“reward” for shareholder approval addresses an issue commonly
encountered in the United States, whereby corporations embed takeover
74
defenses in their charter that the shareholders did not contract for.
However, it also affords the board less leeway in responding to a given
hostile bid.
iii. Target board’s fiduciary duties
Given that securities commissions intervene in boards’ decisions
where they implicate most clearly their fiduciary duties, Canadian
securities law effectively incorporates, and sometimes overlaps with,
75
Canadian corporate law. NP 62-202 and its associated case law purport
to respect the target board’s business judgment in a takeover situation—
where appropriate. In NP 62-202, the CSA determined that it would
have been “inappropriate to specify a code of conduct for directors of a
target company” in addition to their duties of care and loyalty as
76
required by corporate law. However, NP 62-202 expressly identifies
the “possibility that the interests of management of the target company

36 (Ont. Can.).
72
Shay, supra note 54, at 2; see NP 62-202, § 1.1(4).
73
Cf. Robert C. Clark and Leo Strine Jr., Harvard Law School, Lecture to Mergers,
Acquisitions, and Splitups at Harvard Law School: Who Decides? Episode I (Sept.
28, 2010) (describing “lame duck” defenses as those defenses erected during or immediately
preceding a hostile bid). The TSX has always required that any SRP adopted by a TSXlisted company be approved by the corporation’s shareholders within six months of the
SRP’s adoption. See also Shay, supra note 43 at 2. However, as discussed above,
satisfaction (or not) of this requirement usually has been only one of the many factors that a
securities commission considers in assessing the validity of a SRP, tactical or not. And
anyway most takeover battles are over well before the six-month deadline for TSX listing
requirements.
74
Interview with John C. Coates IV, Harvard Law School (Mar. 8, 2011). This situation
can arise when the charter is amended unilaterally after a merger or in a reorganisation of
the corporation, or when the corporation first goes public.
75
Re Lions Gate Entertainment Corp., 2010 BCSECCOM 233, para. 33 (Can.) (citing
to Re BCE Inc., [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (Can.) (asserting that a board has a fiduciary duty “to
act in the best interests of the corporation”).
76
NP 62-202 § 1.1(3).
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77

will differ from those of its shareholders.” This mistrust of
management and the board is the foundational assumption that
Canadian securities commissions rely on to inform and to justify their
interventionist paradigm.
c. Current State of the Law Regarding SRPs: Aberrations and
Turmoil
Recent SRP jurisprudence for the most part has followed and
reaffirmed the interventionist paradigm established in Canadian Jorex
and NP 62-202. In 2010, the BCSC and the OSC each cease-traded a
SRP in two high-profile decisions—Re Lions Gate Entertainment
78
79
Corp. and Re Baffinland Iron Mines Corp., respectively. Both panels
applied traditional Canadian principles regarding takeover defenses.
Their decisions suggest that the core of those principles remains wellestablished among Canada’s securities commissions. However, both
panels expressly responded to prior case law that took a different
approach to one particular issue in the law of takeover defenses: the
ability of a target board to “just say no” in the face of a hostile bid and
80
rely on a SRP to maintain the status quo.
Commentators point out that inconsistencies and uncertainties
continue to exist at the fringes of the law governing the use of a SRP in
the hostile takeover context. Notwithstanding their agreement on core
principles of securities law, the Lions Gate case and the Baffinland case
are not entirely coterminous regarding the ability of a board to “just say
no” in certain circumstances. Specifically, the effect of a shareholder
vote on the legitimacy of a SRP where the board does not search for
81
alternative transactions remains uncertain in Ontario. And the prior
case law that those cases addressed continues to represent an alternative,
82
and some would say more enlightened, take on the issue. That being
77

Id. at § 1.1(1).
2010 BCSECCOM 233 (Can.).
79
[2010] 33 O.S.C. Bull. 11385 (Can.).
80
Re Neo Material Technologies, [2009] 32 O.S.C. Bull. 6941 (Can.) and Re Pulse
Data Systems, [2007] 39 B.L.R. (4th) 138 (ASC Can.).
81
See, e.g., Julius Melnitzer, Baffinland helps clear air on poison pills, LAW TIMES,
Dec.
20, 2010
(quoting
Thomas
Yeo,
Torys LLP),
http://www.lawtimesnews.com/201012208114/Headline-News/Baffinland-helps-clear-airon-poison-pills.
82
Cf. Kevin Marron, “Poison pill” policies all over the map, INVESTMENT EXECUTIVE,
Dec. 06, 2010 (quoting Kevin Thomson, Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP),
http://www.investmentexecutive.com/client/en/News/DetailNews.asp?id=56068&pg=1&Id
78
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said, even this more enlightened view is insufficient: Canadian
securities law takes for granted that securities commissions have the
power to, and should, intervene directly in the affairs of the corporation
in a takeover situation.
i. The BCSC decides Lions Gate, reiterates the auction principle
In Lions Gate, the BCSC held that individual shareholders must be
given the opportunity to respond to a hostile bid directly by deciding
83
whether to tender their shares. The majority of the Lions Gate panel
determined that shareholders cannot collectively tie their own hands by
voting to approve an SRP where the board has not taken steps to seek
any competitive bid or alternative transaction for the target’s
84
shareholders. As a result of this holding, a board cannot use an SRP to
maintain the status quo and continue to pursue its existing business plan
after determining it to be in the best interests of the corporation, even
where they submit that decision to shareholders for an informed
uncoerced vote.
The majority’s decision conceded that in general shareholder
85
ratification of an SRP can be relevant under Royal Host. Yet the panel
asserted that such ratification is not determinative and is only relevant
“in the context of what the SRPs were for”; i.e., allowing the board time
86
and leverage to initiate an auction. The panel held that evidence of
shareholder ratification is only relevant where the target board will use
the SRP to buy additional time to solicit a competing bid or other
87
superior transaction. Since the Lions Gate board had determined to
88
take no steps to seek such an alternative bid or transaction, the majority
of the panel concluded that the issue of shareholder approval of the SRP
89
had been rendered moot. This holding thereby reaffirmed the basic
tenet of Canadian securities law regarding the purpose of the SRP. The
target board has an obligation eventually to relent in the face of a
takeover bid, but also to maximize shareholder value by means of an

Section=27&IdPub=204.
83
Lions Gate, 2010 BCSECCOM at paras. 24, 29.
84
Id. at paras. 55–57.
85
Id. at para 53.
86
Id. at para. 56
87
Id. at paras. 53–58.
88
Id. at paras. 16, 48.
89
Lions Gate, 2010 BCSECCOM at para. 54.
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auction.
ii. The OSC decides Baffinland, reiterates the shareholder
choice principle
In Baffinland, the OSC reiterated the holding in Canadian Jorex
and reaffirmed that case as good law in Ontario. In so doing, the
Baffinland panel rendered the OSC’s position on SRPs relatively clear:
an SRP is contrary to shareholder interests unless it is tied to a “genuine
90
attempt to obtain a better bid.” The OSC expressly invoked the
Canadian Jorex case, stating that
. . . it is generally time for a shareholder rights plan “to go” when the
[SRP] has served its purpose by facilitating an auction, encouraging
competing bids or otherwise maximizing shareholder value. A [SRP]
will be cease traded where it is unlikely to achieve any further
91
benefits for shareholders.

The Baffinland panel then cited Canadian Jorex to express
confidence in shareholders’ ability to decide how to dispose of their
92
shares. The Baffinland panel thereby reaffirmed a conception of
shareholders as sophisticated entities “capable of making the relevant
93
choices” with regard to competing bids for their shares, just as the
Canadian Jorex panel had twenty years earlier.
d. Aberration in SRP Jurisprudence: 2007–10
The specific holdings in the Baffinland case and the Lions Gate
case must be understood as a direct response to post-2007 developments
in SRP jurisprudence. In 2007 and 2009, the ASC and the OSC each
declined to cease-trade an SRP in two high-profile decisions—Re Pulse
94
95
Data Inc. and Re Neo Material Technologies Inc., respectively. Both
panels appeared to take a nontraditional approach to the question of
whether a board can “just say no” in certain circumstances. Both panels
respected the decision of a board acting with the authority of its
shareholders but without any intent to create an auction by soliciting
competing bids.
90
91
92
93
94
95

Melnitzer, supra note 83.
33 O.S.C. Bull. at para. 26.
Id. at para. 27 (citing Canadian Jorex, para. 15).
Id. at paras. 54–55.
[2007] 39 B.L.R. (4th) 138 (ASC Can.).
[2009] 32 O.S.C. Bull. 6941 (Can.).
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In Pulse Data, the ASC declined to cease-trade an SRP instituted
as the only response to a hostile takeover bid. The panel identified the
protection of the bona fide interests of the target shareholders as its
96
primary consideration in evaluating the Pulse Data SRP. The panel
determined that the Pulse Data shareholders had approved the SRP
shortly before the bid, with the benefit of “an extraordinary amount of
information on which to evaluate the Rights Plan in the face of the
97
[Seitel] offer.”
Furthermore, the ASC expressed a reluctance to
interfere with a decision reached by a board exercising its fiduciary duty
98
to act in the best interest of shareholders.
In Neo, the OSC declined to cease-trade a SRP on similar grounds
based on similar facts. First, the panel determined that:
. . . there is no evidence that the process undertaken by the Neo
Board to evaluate and respond to the Pala Offer, including the
decision to implement the Second [SRP], was not carried out in what
the Neo Board determined to be the best interests of the corporation
99
and of the Neo shareholders, as a whole . . . .

Second, the panel referred to (i) the fact that an “overwhelming
majority” of Neo’s shareholders approved the SRP, and (ii) the fact that
100
Neo’s shareholders were adequately informed and free from coercion.
Both panels therefore seemed to apply a different test from the
traditional application of NP 62-202 and the Royal Host factors. In
neither case did the target board take any steps to seek out alternative
transactions. But in each case, the panel determined that the target
shareholders’ recent informed and overwhelming approval of the SRP
101
constituted the shareholders’ express rejection of the offer. This
reasoning exemplifies a conception of the board as protecting the
shareholders from themselves, thereby counteracting the collective
action problem that faces every widely-held corporation in a hostile bid
102
situation. Additionally, both panels based their decisions in part on the
96

Pulse Data, 39 B.L.R. at para 93.
Id. at para. 101.
98
Id. at para. 101(e).
99
32 O.S.C. Bull. at para. 18(b).
100
Id. at para. 18(c)–(e).
101
Allan Coleman and Cameron A. MacDonald, The Path Forward: Poison Pills in
Canada After Pulse Data, Neo, and Lions Gate, OSLER HOSKIN & HARCOURT LLP – EREVIEWS: CORPORATE REVIEW (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.osler.com/
newsresources/Details.aspx?id=2822&col=.
102
See Robert C. Clark and Leo Strine Jr., supra note 74.
97
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boards’ exercise of their fiduciary duties under corporate law. The
panels referred to the adequate process followed by the board and the
efforts to ensure both board and shareholders were adequately informed.
In particular, the Neo panel specifically referred to the SCC’s recent
103
formulation of the business judgment rule: under the BCE case, the
board’s fiduciary duties in the face of a hostile bid are not limited solely
to maximizing short-term profit or share value, and instead can be
exercised for the broader purpose of protecting the long-term interests
104
of shareholders. The two panels thereby broke with conventional
securities law doctrine, but acted in harmony with Canadian corporate
common law.
e. Summation of Recent Jurisprudence: 2007–10
Commentators generally regard these recent decisions as
addressing the availability of the Nancy Reagan defense to the boards of
Canadian companies—i.e., whether a target board may “just say no” in
the face of a hostile bid and rely on an SRP to maintain the status quo.
Historically, boards have not been permitted to do so notwithstanding
an informed determination that maintaining the status quo would be in
the best interest of the corporation. The BCSC maintained that position
even in the face of a shareholder vote ratifying that informed
105
determination. However, the OSC did not expressly state a position
regarding the effect of a shareholder vote on a SRP where the board
106
admitted it was not searching for alternatives. There is some question
whether Neo remains good law on that issue in Ontario. There is no
question that Pulse Data remains good law in Alberta.
Where “the success or failure of a hostile takeover bid may well
depend largely on the province in which the head office of the target
107
company is located,” a particular securities commission’s silence on a
particular salient aspect of SRP jurisprudence can cause unnecessary
confusion among companies and their boards and investors. Such a
“dichotomy in the regulatory system in Canada with regard to the
103

Neo, 32 O.S.C. Bull. at para. 107.
BCE, 3 S.C.R. at para. 38.
105
Lions Gate, 2010 BCSECCOM at para 55
106
Melnitzer, supra note 83.
107
Kevin Marron, “Poison pill” policies all over the map, INVESTMENT EXECUTIVE,
Dec. 6, 2010 (quoting Kevin Thomson, Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP),
http://www.investmentexecutive.com/client/en/News/DetailNews.asp?id=56068&pg=1&Id
Section=27&IdPub=204.
104
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regulation of hostile change-of-control transactions” undermines
investor confidence and inhibits the efficient functioning of Canada’s
108
capital markets.
These interventionist approaches to a board’s exercise of its
fiduciary duties raise concerns about the way boards are regulated in the
context of a takeover bid under current Canadian securities law. But
even allowing shareholders to ratify the board’s decision in a
shareholder vote (as was the case in Neo and Pulse Data) is not an
adequately hands-off approach. Commissions should allow boards the
discretion to act in what they determine to be the best interest of the
corporation. They should recognize that boards are constrained by their
fiduciary duties and by free exercise of the shareholder franchise.
f. Potential Conflict Between Provincial Securities Law and
Corporate Law Principles of Fiduciary Duty
Securities commission decisions before the Neo case have raised
the tension that exists in Canada between securities law and corporate
law. For example, in Re Tarxien Corp., the OSC cease-traded an SRP
even though the panel found no evidence that the defendant board had
acted other than in what the directors believed to be the shareholders’
109
best interests. The panel determined that “whether the Directors of
Tarxien had exercised their fiduciary duties in setting up the [SRP]” was
not a “relevant [consideration] for the decision [that they] had to
110
make.” This holding explicitly acknowledges that a different set of
imperatives drives securities commissions, which necessarily influences
boards.
However, from the perspective of a board of directors, the SCC’s
determination of the board’s fiduciary duty is a highly relevant
consideration for the decisions that they have to make. The Court’s
determination in the BCE case directly impacts the fiduciary duty
calculus in the context of takeover defense strategies. In the BCE case,
the Court held that:
[t]he fiduciary duty of the directors to the corporation is a broad,
contextual concept. It is not confined to short-term profit or share
value. Where the corporation is an ongoing concern, it looks to the
long-term interests of the corporation. The content of this duty varies
108
109
110

Id.
Re Tarxien Corp., [1996] 19 O.S.C. Bull. 6913, para. 25 (Can.).
Id.
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with the situation at hand. At a minimum, it requires the directors to
ensure that the corporation meets its statutory obligations. But,
depending on the context, there may also be other requirements. In
any event, the fiduciary duty owed by directors is mandatory;
directors must look to what is in the best interests of the
111
corporation.

This passage captures the tension between the board’s duty to the
corporation and the securities commission’s public interest in
shareholder well-being. Securities commissions, interpreting NP 62202, focus exclusively on shareholder interests in the short term. On the
other hand, the board must consider the long-term interest of the
corporation as a whole, and is not subject to the same shareholder112
primacy Revlon duties as in the United States. “There is no principle
[in Canadian corporate law] that one set of interests—for example the
interests of shareholders—should prevail over another set of
113
interests.” In fact, this conception of the board’s fiduciary duties
“could be seen to obligate a board of directors to embark on a course of
114
action that is inconsistent with NP 62-202” and its inherent skepticism
toward a board’s business judgment in a takeover context—which
skepticism is contrary to Canadian corporate common law.
Securities commissions have taken this skeptical stance to heart.
For example, in Re Consolidated Properties Ltd., the OSC stated that:
[i]f there appears to be a real and substantial possibility that, given a
reasonable period of further time, the board of the target corporation
can increase shareholder choice and maximize shareholder value,
then, absent some other compelling reason requiring the termination
of the [SRP] in the interests of shareholders, it seems to us that the
Commission should allow the [SRP] to function for such further
period, so as to allow management and the board to continue to fulfil
115
their fiduciary duties.

111

BCE, 3 S.C.R. at para. 38.
Id. at para. 87 (“the Revlon line of cases has not displaced the fundamental rule that
the duty of directors cannot be confined to particular priority rules, but is rather a function
of business judgment of what is in the best interest of the corporation, in the particular
situation it faces.”).
113
Id. at para. 84.
114
Shay, supra note 58, at 3. (emphasis added).
115
[2000] 23 O.S.C. Bull. 7981, para. 35 (Can.) (citing Re MDC Corp. and Regal
Greetings and Gifts Inc., [1994] 17 O.S.C. Bull. 4971, 4979 (Can.)).
112
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The Consolidated Properties panel thereby acknowledged the role
that corporate law fiduciary duties play in guiding the target board’s
decision-making regarding a SRP or other takeover defenses. But the
panel—acting with reference to NP 62-202—expressly substituted its
own judgment for that of the board’s regarding the likelihood that the
board “can increase shareholder choice and maximize shareholder
116
value.” Similarly, the panel reserved to itself the determination of
what would constitute a “reasonable period of further time” and what
would constitute a “compelling reason requiring the termination of the
117
[SRP].”
In overseeing the board’s fulfillment of their fiduciary duties, the
panel made its own independent assessment of the circumstances of the
takeover contest and applied its own judgment to those circumstances.
This tradition of exercising independent assessment and judgment was
118
established in the Canadian Jorex case. It is central to the regulatory
function that Canadian securities commissions serve in constraining
target board action in the face of a hostile takeover bid. Such a tradition
underlying a system of securities regulation betrays (i) an intense
mistrust of the target board’s willingness to fulfill its fiduciary duties in
a takeover situation and (ii) a lack of faith in the statutory regime that
Canada’s legislatures have created to protect the shareholder franchise.
Instead, this tradition represents a reliance on active regulatory bodies to
make the necessary determinations and oversee, on behalf of the
corporation’s shareholders, the board’s actions on behalf of those
shareholders. However, that well-established tradition of independent
judgment runs contrary to a fundamental principle in both Canadian and
American corporate law: that directors and shareholders should decide,
not courts nor regulators.
The tension between court and securities commission played out in
Neo and subsequent case law. Based on that case law, Canada’s
securities commissions seem to have settled on a position that
undermines the Supreme Court’s conception of fiduciary duty in
situations where the exercise of those duties is most context-specific
and where the tension between short-term and long-term value is cast in
starkest relief.

116
117
118

Id
Id.
See text accompanying notes 61–66.
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Canada’s securities commissions might have let directors make
those important determinations according to fiduciary duties that are
determined and enforced by courts and prosecuted by shareholders.
Instead, commissions insert themselves into the mix and impose their
own conception of what the best outcome might be in a hostile bid
situation. Commissions act based on their opinion of the outcome that
they believe to be in the “public interest” despite having no robust
incentives to determine definitively what that public interest is in any
given situation. As a result, they end up imposing a tight and largely
119
inflexible timeline in which a besieged board is expected to defend its
shareholders from the siren song of a bid premium—and its promise of
immediate gratification for shareholders, many of whom are operating
on such thin margins that locking in any gain is a victory—with words
alone.
III. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
1. Introduction
a. Canada, the United States, and the Interco case
Despite better protection of the shareholder franchise, Canada is
more restrictive of boards’ use of takeover defenses. Canada’s system is
essentially identical to the approach to takeover defenses outlined in
120
City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc. In Interco, Chancellor
Allen held that a board’s good faith determination that an offer was
inadequate could justify leaving a takeover defense such as an SRP in
place for some “period” of time while the board worked to protect
121
shareholder interests. Chancellor Allen’s model provided that a board
could protect shareholder interests by negotiating with the bidder,
seeking out an alternative transaction, or presenting an alternative of its
122
own to the shareholders. But “[o]nce that period has closed . . . and
[the board] has taken such time as it required in good faith to arrange an
alternative value-maximizing transaction, then, in most instances, the
legitimate role of the [SRP] in the context of a non-coercive offer will
119

Thomson et al., supra note 49 (“Generally, the commissions will cease trade the pill
somewhere in the range of 45 to 70 days after the start of the unsolicited bid.”).
120
551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
121
Id. at 798
122
Id.
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123

have been fully satisfied.” The Delaware Supreme Court gave that
case severely negative treatment in Paramount Communications Inc. v.
124
Time Inc. As a result, subsequent American jurisprudence took a
125
different path from the one outlined in the Interco case. Yet it is the
Interco paradigm that underlies the Canadian Jorex approach to
takeover defenses.
Justice Jacobs of the Delaware Supreme Court might consider
Canada’s Interco-like approach to be more enlightened and forwardlooking than the United States’ “paternalistic model” of shareholder
protection in light of the increasing sophistication of shareholders that
126
he sees in modern capital markets. Justice Jacobs’s observations apply
equally, if not more, in Canada. In Canada, an even more significant
percentage of shareholders in corporations across the capital markets
127
are, or are represented by, sophisticated institutional shareholders. But
though shareholders in both countries have “[come] to be viewed as
highly sophisticated investors with no need of protection by boards, and
128
only to a limited extent by courts,” Delaware law has retained the
concept of substantive coercion and its attendant permission of board
discretion in the face of takeover bids. Since the Time case Delaware
courts have not independently determined whether an SRP has expired
and therefore should be struck down. As recently confirmed in the
129
Airgas case (foreshadowed by, inter alia, the Delaware District
130
Court’s opinion in Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs. Inc. ), the
board of directors of a target corporation is entitled to use an SRP for as
long a period of time as the board deems warranted. This stance
generally persists notwithstanding Delaware decisions such as the

123

Id.
571 A.2d 1140, 1152–53 (Del. 1990) (though never expressly overruled it as the
Interco case did not come before that court).
125
See, e.g., Air Prods. & Chems. Inc. v. Airgas Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011).
126
Jack B. Jacobs, Paradigm Shifts in American Corporate Governance Law: A
Quarter Century of Experience, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR 1, 2 (Sept./Oct. 2007).
127
See Hansell, et al., The Quality of the Shareholder Vote in Canada 6, Note 3 (Davies
Ward
Phillips
&
Vineberg
LLP,
Discussion
Paper)
(Oct.
22, 2010),
http://www.dwpv.com/Sites/shareholdervoting/media/The-Quality-of-the-Shareholder-Votein-Canad.pdf (“According to Bloomberg, as of August 2010, the average holding by
institutional investors in S&P/TSX 60 Index companies is 56.79%.”).
128
Jacobs, supra note 128, at 3.
129
Airgas, 16 A.3d at 48.
130
907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995).
124
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131

Chesapeake case and the Topps case, and notwithstanding Chancellor
Chandler’s own apparent ambivalence about the wisdom of the
doctrine.
Instead, as Justice Jacobs writes, the American corporate law
system “relies heavily upon shareholder voting as the basis to legitimize
corporate action” by directors who decide “how to deploy billions of
132
dollars of assets that the directors do not own.” In the United States,
the board is limited primarily by the constraints imposed by the
shareholder franchise, which reinforces the U.S.’s “representative
democracy” model of corporate governance. This powerful motif has
run through Delaware case law since the Blasius case—even though
Delaware’s protections of the shareholder franchise are less robust than
those in Canada. Specifically, Delaware General Corporation Law
133
§ 141(d) permits classified boards of directors. Further,Delaware case
law has permitted implicit assaults on the shareholder franchise,
134
notwithstanding the equitable imperatives of the Blasius case.
b. Canada and the Shareholder Franchise; Proposal
These techniques, permitted and even common in the U.S.,

131

135

are

Jacobs, supra note 128, at 3 (citing Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293
(Del. Ch. 2000) (holding that if shareholders are smart enough to decide whether to invest in
a particular company without board intervention, then they should be regarded as intelligent
enough to decide whether to exit that investment), and In re The Topps Co. Shareholder
Litig., 924 A.2d 951 (Del. Ch. 2007) (ordering target company to amend its proxy statement
to include material facts that would enable the target shareholders to choose between the
two competing offers on an informed basis, on the basis that the target’s highly
sophisticated shareholders could decide for themselves whether or not to tender (and into
which offer to tender) so long as they had adequate information).
132
Id. at 4 (citing Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659
(Del. Ch. 1988), and stating parenthetically that “[t]he shareholder franchise is the
ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”).
133
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2011).
134
See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388–89 (Del. 1995). In
Unitrin, the court allowed the Unitrin board to put in a SRP then to “thin the herd” by
repurchasing (likely) antagonistic votes, thereby tilting the playing field steeply in their
favor. Robert C. Clark and Leo Strine Jr., Harvard Law School, Lecture to Mergers,
Acquisitions, and Splitups at Harvard Law School: The Death of “Enhanced” Scrutiny
(Oct. 19, 2010).
135
Robert C. Clark and Leo Strine Jr., Harvard Law School, Lecture to Mergers,
Acquisitions, and Splitups at Harvard Law School: The Death of “Enhanced” Scrutiny
(Oct. 19, 2010); Mark Gordon, Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz LLP, Lecture to the Mergers
& Acquisitions Workshop at Harvard Law School: Course Overview – Seeing the Forest
(Jan. 3, 2011).
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for the most part unavailable to Canadian boards. Canadian courts
scrutinize discriminatory repurchases in the context of a hostile takeover
bid and generally will prevent directors from manipulating the
136
shareholder franchise by such means.
As discussed below,
shareholders of Canadian corporations are entitled to call (or
“requisition”) a special meeting at any time and may remove any
director by ordinary resolution at that meeting. These are strong
safeguards of the shareholder franchise. Canada should recognize that
those safeguards are sufficient, should adopt a more permissive stance
toward regulation of takeover defense, and should trust shareholders to
decide for themselves whether the directors are acting in their interests
and in the interests of the corporation.
Acting on this proposal requires a number of changes, which at
least requires rethinking NP 62-202 and the role of the CSA in
developing national securities law. But, overall, so fundamentally
changing the way securities law operates in Canada likely requires a
national securities regulator. Enacting the legislation to create a national
securities regulator would provide the opportunity to revise and limit
the public interest jurisdiction that provincial securities commissions
currently use to intervene in hostile takeover situations. The statutory
authority that the commissions have under provincial securities law is
too broad and too ill-defined. Moreover, this broad jurisdiction has
permitted the commissions to develop a body of case law that
effectively contradicts the law of the land as handed down by the
Supreme Court of Canada. Canada’s Parliament should resolve this
conflict in the regulation of Canada’s corporations. Parliament should
limit the commissions’ ability to continue undermining corporate law
fiduciary duties. Parliament should trust the statutory regime that it and
the provincial legislatures have developed to protect shareholder
franchise.
This argument to depend on shareholder franchise is particularly
persuasive in a capital market such as Canada’s where institutional
136

See, e.g., 347883 Alberta Ltd. v. Producers Pipelines, Inc., [1991] 80 D.L.R. (4th)
359 (Can. Sask. Ct. App.) (holding that board could not offer a discriminatory share
repurchase program to dilute plaintiff–shareholder). But see 360713779 Icahn Partners LP v.
Lions Gate Entm’t Corp., [2010] B.C.S.C. 1547, 75 B.L.R. (4th) 212, paras. 178–86 (Can.)
(permitting the board to convert debt to equity in advance of a proxy battle where the CEO
knew that the former debtholder would support the board rather than the bidder, based on
ulterior motives of the plaintiff–shareholder and in light of benefits of the deleveraging to
the corporation).
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shareholders predominate. Institutional investors own on average over
137
half of the shares of every company on the S&P/TSX 60 Index. These
market conditions reduce the voter apathy collective-action problem
with regard to exercise of the shareholder franchise that might prevail in
a more dispersed capital market. These institutional investors are
professional shareholders: it’s their job to monitor directors. Relying on
the shareholder base and its franchise to discipline directors therefore
becomes a viable option.
Relying on the shareholder franchise also addresses the problems
associated with a high level of institutional shareholder ownership.
138
Institutional investors are influenced by short-term imperatives.
Merger arbitrage is a serious issue, as bids (or tender offers) present
opportunities for opportunistic share purchases and sales. Chancellor
Chandler recognized this issue in the Airgas case. In Airgas, the
Chancellor held that a board could maintain an SRP in the face of a
hostile bid based on a substantive coercion rationale in large part
because of the threat of arbitrageurs: “The threat of ‘arbs’ is a new facet
of substantive coercion, different from the substantive coercion claim
139
recognized in Paramount.” The Chancellor found “sufficient evidence
that a majority of stockholders might be willing to tender their shares
regardless of whether the price is adequate or not”, because “a large
number—if not all—of the arbitrageurs who bought into Airgas’s stock
at prices significantly below the $70 offer price would be happy to
tender their shares at that price regardless of the potential long-term
140
value of the company.”
Canada’s “forced sale-by-auction” model enables such short-term
thinking by shareholders to prevail—and even encourages it.
Shareholders can do what they like with their own property. They are
entitled to sell their shares to a willing buyer on the open market.
However, a takeover bid is not about individual shareholders selling
their individual property. It is about selling control of a corporation.
Shareholders have no right to a control premium under either Canadian
law or American law. But boards do have a right to manage the
137

Hansell, et al., supra note 129, at 6.
Leo E. Strine Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act
and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 10 (Nov. 2010) (“For a variety of reasons, these
institutional investors often have a myopic concern for short-term performance.”).
139
Airgas, 16 A.3d at 108.
140
Id. at 111.
138
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corporation and craft its business strategy. Selling a corporation is a
business strategy decision related to the management of the corporation.
Accordingly, that decision should be left to the board.
Channeling the decision-making by Canadian shareholders into the
proxy vote would avoid a heat-of-the-moment snap decision whether to
tender to a bid and would prevent opportunistic cost-conscious bottomline oriented shareholders from derailing the corporation’s long-term
business strategy for the promise of a couple of bucks. It would allow
for a more rational business planning–oriented decision by shareholders
as well as by the board.
2. Operation of Canada’s Proxy Vote Safety Valve.
a. Shareholder Meetings
i. The good
The classified board is effectively impossible in Canada. Formally,
a corporation may create a classified board in its charter, but
shareholders of a Canadian corporation may remove a director by
141
ordinary resolution (i.e., by a simple majority ) either at the
corporation’s annual general meeting or at a special meeting
requisitioned for that purpose (by the holders of at least five percent of
the corporation’s issued voting shares). Moreover, a corporation’s
articles may not provide that the number of shareholder votes required
142
to remove a director be greater than a simple majority. The
shareholders then can choose to fill the vacancy created by removing a
143
director at the same meeting. A court will not interfere with a
properly-called shareholder meeting merely because the purpose of that
144
meeting is to remove directors and elect a new board.
141
Business Corporations Act (Ontario), R.S.O., ch. B 16 (1990) (“OBCA”), §§ 5(5),
122(1) (Can.) (subject to the qualification that “a director may not be removed from office if
the votes cast against the director’s removal would be sufficient to elect him or her and such
votes could be voted cumulatively at an election at which the same total number of votes
were cast and the number of directors required by the articles were then being elected,”
§ 120(f)); Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., ch. C 44 (1985)(“CBCA”), § 6(4)
(Can.).
142
Fox v. Castello Casino Corp., [2000] 8 B.L.R. (3d) 68 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).
143
CBCA § 109(1); OBCA § 122(1); see Bill Gula & Richard Fridman, Unsolicited
Takeover Bids: Defensive Strategies, Guide to the Leading 500 Lawyers in Canada, Jan.
2, 2006, http://www.dwpv.com/en/17623_17198.aspx.
144
Fox v. Castello Casino Corp., 8 B.L.R. at 68. However, where that is the purpose of
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The board must call a meeting within twenty-one days of receiving
notice from the requisitioning shareholder. The board then must send
the notice as specified in the corporation’s bylaws; though the OBCA
limits the permissible advance-notice range for public companies to
145
between twenty-one and fifty days before the actual meeting. If the
board fails to call the requisitioned meeting, then the requisitioning
146
shareholder may do so.
Shareholders are entitled to claim
reimbursement from the corporation “for the expenses reasonably
incurred by them in requisitioning, calling and holding the meeting”—
which expenses include the cost of publishing notice to all
147
shareholders.
Together these statutory protections enshrine the shareholders’
right to determine who represents them on the corporation’s board.
Relative to shareholders in American corporations, shareholders in
Canadian corporations are well-positioned to discipline their agents, the
directors. Directors effectively are constantly up for election. Canadian
regulators and legislators should respect and reinforce this model of
corporate accountability and control rather than create a regulatory
environment where corporations are constantly in play. The solution is
to allow directors to make decisions regarding the corporation’s
business strategy while ensuring that shareholders have these necessary
mechanisms to discipline their agents.
ii. The bad
Notwithstanding the statutory protection that Canadian
shareholders enjoy in disciplining directors, the field is not entirely
tilted in the shareholder’s favor. For example, shareholders typically
cannot raise a motion to remove a director from office directly from the
148
floor during a shareholder meeting. Accordingly, removal of a director
typically is accomplished by shareholder proposal and so potentially is

the meeting, the meeting notice must state that an election is to be held upon successful
removal of the challenged director.
145
OBCA § 96(1); cf. CBCA § 135(1), Reg. 44 (setting sixty days as the maximum of
the range). Under both statutes, for private companies the minimum is ten days.
146
OBCA § 105(4); CBCA § 143(4).
147
OBCA § 105(6); CBCA § 43(6).
148
M. KAYE KERR & HUBERT W. KING, PROCEDURES FOR MEETINGS AND
ORGANIZATIONS 185 (Carswell Legal Publications, 1984). If specific notice for the item is
required, the motion may not be raised directly from the floor during the meeting.
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149

subject to several procedural hurdles.
In order to submit a proposal (to remove a director or otherwise),
the shareholder must satisfy certain requirements. The investor must
either:
 Own not less than five percent of the corporation’s issued
voting shares;
 Have registered those shares (or else forego the right to
submit a proposal requisitioning a special meeting at all);
and
 “[H]ave held an interest in at least [one per cent] of the
corporation’s shares with a market value of at least
$2,000.00 for at least six months prior to the day before the
shareholder submits its proposal”;
Or:


“[H]ave the support of other investors who meet those
150
requirements in the aggregate.”

And “[i]f the person who submits the proposal fails to continue to
satisfy [these] criteria up to and including the date of the meeting, then
for a period of two years after the date of that meeting, any proposal
made by that person will not be included in any management
151
[information] circular [i.e., in management’s proxy materials].”
An eligible shareholder submitting a proposal to remove a director
of a public company must provide valid notice of the special meeting to
each (voting) shareholder. The proposing shareholder must send the
notice as specified in the corporation’s bylaws, though the OBCA limits
the permissible advance-notice range to between twenty-one and
152
fifty days before the actual meeting.
The notice must include the text of any special resolution. It also
must include a statement describing any special business to be
149
Hansell, et al., supra note 129. (“[A] matter that is put on the agenda of a meeting of
shareholders at the initiative of one or more shareholders, rather than the initiative of
management.”) (referring to the CBCA and the OBCA).
150
Id. at 45–46 (quoting, at note 104, Canada Business Corporations Regulations, 2001,
S.O.R./2001-512, § 46 (Can.)).
151
Id. at 45.
152
OBCA § 96(1); cf. CBCA § 135(1), Reg. 44 (setting sixty days as the maximum of
the range). Under both statutes, for private companies the minimum is ten days.
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transacted at the meeting “in sufficient detail to permit [a] shareholder
153
to form a reasoned judgement” on the matter at issue. However, any
shareholder proposal and statement relating to special business together
154
cannot exceed 500 words. Even if shareholders manage to get on the
meeting agenda, “currently many shareholders are rushed through their
155
presentation, often being timed with a large clock.” On the other hand,
a director who is the subject of a proposal to be removed has a right to
156
attend the meeting and be heard, including via written statement that is
157
read by the meeting’s chairman.
Moreover, the corporation is not required to circulate a shareholder
proposal or any statement made in connection with a proposal where:








153

The proposal is not submitted to the corporation at least
sixty days before the anniversary date of the last annual
meeting (if the matter is proposed to be raised at an annual
meeting), or at least sixty days before a meeting other than
the annual meeting (if the matter is proposed to be raised at
a meeting other than the annual meeting);
It clearly appears that the primary purpose of the proposal
is to enforce a personal claim or redress a personal
grievance against the corporation or any of its directors,
officers or security-holders;
It clearly appears that the proposal does not relate in any
significant way to the business or affairs of the corporation;
Not more than two years before the receipt of the proposal,
a person failed to present, in person or by proxy, at a
meeting of shareholders, a proposal that, at the person’s
request, had been included in a management information
circular relating to the meeting; or
Substantially the same proposal was submitted to

OBCA § 96(6)(b).
O. Reg. 59/07 (Can.), R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 62, para. 23.4 (“For the purposes of
subsection 99(3.1) of the Act, the proposal referred to in subsection 99(2) of the Act and the
statement referred to in subsection 99(3) of the Act shall together not exceed 500 words.”).
155
HON. MICHAEL D. CHONG, M.P., STATUTORY REVIEW OF THE CANADA BUSINESS
CORPORATIONS ACT: REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY 12 (June 2010) (citing testimony of Laura O’Neill, SHARE, to the Standing
House of Commons Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Meeting No. 43
(Nov. 16, 2009, 16:00)), available at http://publications.gc.ca.
156
OBCA § 123(1); CBCA § 110(1).
157
OBCA § 123(2); CBCA § 110(1).
154
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shareholders in a management information circular or
dissident’s information circular relating to a meeting of
shareholders held within two years preceding the receipt of
158
the shareholder’s request and the proposal was defeated.
The process of shareholder proposal submission can be litigated in
two ways related to these grounds. The corporation may apply
affirmatively to a court to restrain circulation of a shareholder proposal
159
with its management information circular.
Alternatively, the
corporation may just refuse to circulate the proposal and prompt the
shareholder to apply to a court to order that management include the
proposal, typically requiring that the shareholder attempt to delay the
160
meeting at which the proposal would be voted on. These potential
responses by the corporation to a shareholder proposal to remove a
director potentially increase the cost and delay associated with a
shareholder meeting. The cost and delay limit the protection that
Canada’s statutory regime affords to shareholders.
However, these restrictions on shareholder ability to initiate a
proxy battle to challenge a particular director or the entire board are not
unreasonable. Canada’s statutory regime protects the exercise of the
shareholder franchise, but also provides procedural checks that strive to
protect the board from frivolous or malicious shareholder conduct.
iii.The ugly
For shareholder voting to be an effective tool in constraining and
disciplining directors, the mechanisms by which votes are cast and
counted need to be robust and reliable. However, the current state of the
proxy voting system limits the effectiveness of the shareholder franchise
in determining the will of a corporation’s shareholders. Improving the
integrity of the system in practice would allow Canada to rely with
more confidence on its admirable statutory protection of the shareholder
franchise.
161
The proxy voting system has several issues. First, the system is
complicated and opaque. Many parties (often acting through third party
representatives) interact and communicate with one another by means
158
159
160
161

OBCA § 99(5).
OBCA § 99(9); CBCA § 137(9).
OBCA § 99(8); CBCA § 137(8) (reen. 2001, § 59(4)).
The following paragraph is based on Hansell, et al., supra note 129, at ii–iii.
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susceptible to administrative and technological error. This error is
difficult to identify and correct because of the multiple parties involved
and the lack of an established system of interaction. Second, there is one
proxy agent for almost all intermediaries in Canada. This proxy agent’s
conduct and compliance with what regulation exists currently are not
regulated. Third, votes may be cast by persons who have no economic
interest in the issuer. This separation of voting interest and economic
interest means that voting is susceptible to strategic manipulation on
behalf of interests other than the long-term success of the corporation.
Fourth, how the votes are tabulated and proxies are cast is completely
unregulated. Moreover, securities regulators do not monitor compliance
with those aspects of the system that they do regulate.
However, practitioners have begun a dialogue proposing solutions
to the problems with the proxy voting system. This dialogue has
162
brought public attention to these issues. The dialogue and attention is
encouraging, suggesting that there is appetite for change in Canada’s
legal and business communities.
Another hurdle is the use of director slates in board elections.
Approximately twenty-five percent of Canada’s largest public
163
corporations currently use slate voting for directors. This means that it
is difficult for shareholders to target their dissatisfaction against
particular directors. However, there is a bright light on the horizon.
Traditionally proxy contests have been rare in Canada; takeover bids
have been “the principal method by which an acquiror will seek to
acquire control of a target company on a non-negotiated basis” because
164
of their high likelihood of success under the Canadian system. But
more recently shareholders have been starting to use their votes to
express dissatisfaction with particular directors, especially as
162

See, e.g., Drew Hasselback, Quality of the Shareholder Vote, NATIONAL POST, Feb.
16, 2011,
available
at
http://business.financialpost.com/2011/02/16/quality-of-theshareholder-vote/#more-27989 (discussing Hansell, The Quality of the Shareholder Vote in
Canada).
163
HON. MICHAEL D. CHONG, M.P., STATUTORY REVIEW OF THE CANADA BUSINESS
CORPORATIONS ACT: REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY 12, (June 2010) (citing Testimony of Judy Cotte, CCGG, to the Standing
House of Commons Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Meeting No. 43
(Nov. 16, 2009, 15.55 PM)).
164
WILLIAM J. BRAITHWAITE AND JOHN J. CIARDULLO, STIKEMAN ELLIOTT LLP, M&A IN
CANADA 3, (May 2004), www.stikeman.com/newslett/IFLRMA04.pdf; see also Marvin
Yontef and Simon Romano, Canada, § 3.3, in ICLG TO: MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 2008,
available at www.iclg.co.uk.
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shareholders respond to a flagging economy with increased levels of
165
activism.
As a result there has been “an increase in the number of proxy
166
battles for control of boards of directors.” Majority voting has
facilitated these trends as that system becomes more common among
Canadian corporations. Specifically,
[i]n 2010, of the 142 issuers who reported their voting results for
director elections, the average percentage of votes withheld was
8.9 percent of votes cast. Fifteen issuers had at least one director that
received 20 percent or more votes withheld with respect to his or her
nomination. Seven issuers had at least one director that received
25 percent or more votes withheld with respect to his or her
167
nomination.

Given the limited ability of a Canadian corporation to build
168
structural defensive measures directly into its charter or bylaws, this
uptick in proxy battle activity represents a potentially positive trend in
exercise of the shareholder franchise that regulators and legislators
169
should respond to.
b. Written Consent
Shareholders have an option other than taking action at a meeting.
Shareholders also may act by unanimous written consent through “a
resolution in writing signed by all the shareholders [or their attorney
authorized in writing] entitled to vote on that resolution at a meeting of
shareholders.” This type of resolution “is as valid as if it had been
passed at a meeting of the shareholders” and satisfies all requirements
of the Act relating to that meeting of shareholders. The only relevant
exception to this written consent option is where a director being
removed decides to submit a written statement in his defense, as
165

Telephone Interview with Sean Farrell, McMillan LLP (Apr. 19, 2011).
Sean Farrell & Robert McDermott, Canada, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN 61
JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: 2010 55 (Casey Cogut ed.) (Law Business Research Ltd., 2010)
(1998), available at http://www.gettingthedealthrough.com/books/21/mergers-acquisitions/.
167
Hansell, et al., supra note 129, at 12–13.
168
See TORYS LLP, TAKEOVER BIDS IN CANADA AND TENDER OFFERS IN THE UNITED
STATES:
A
GUIDE
FOR
ACQUIRORS
AND
TARGETS
30–31
(2009),
http://www.torys.com/Publications/Documents/Publication%20PDFs/Takeover_Bids_Guide
_2009.pdf (enumerating defensive measures common in the U.S. and contrasting Canada).
169
Cf. Thomson et al., supra note 60, at A74. (contrasting Canada’s liberal director
removal process with proxy battles in the U.S., which “can be a time consuming proposition
that can last well over a year”).
166
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170

3. A Selection of Alternative Proposals
a. “Time-test” proposal
One alternative proposal to change the current state of Canadian
takeover defense regulation is to extend the amount of time during
171
which boards are permitted to keep an SRP in place. Its proponent
argues that more time would “enable[ ] management to formulate a
superior strategic alternative” rather than “being forced to relinquish
172
control due to external circumstances.”
However, such a proposal assumes that there are circumstances
where a transaction is not in the best interests of the corporation but
shareholders nevertheless would tender to a hostile bid. Furthermore,
perpetuating the time-test approach to takeover defense regulation
cannot help but impose yet another arbitrary limit on the amount of time
where that period of time is decided by a regulator and not by the board
or by shareholders. A regulation-based “solution” raises the related
questions of “who knows best?” and “who decides?” The time-test
proposal answers these questions by vesting power in regulators. But it
is the board and the shareholders that we actually should allow to make
major transformational decisions with regard to the fate of the
corporation.
Moreover, such a proposal does not adequately countenance the
relative ease with which directors can be removed from Canadian
boards. Boards need the added protection of the SRP to balance against
that constant threat of impeachment that they face, directors still can be
sued for breach of fiduciary duty or for interfering with exercise of the
shareholder franchise. The U.S. historically has relied more heavily on
173
these tools notwithstanding their less robust character there. Canada
should capitalize on its advantages in protection of the shareholder
franchise.

170

OBCA § 123(1)-(2).
See, e.g., Ronald Podolny, Fixing What Ain’t Broke: In Defence of Canadian Poison
Pill Regulation, 67 U.T. FAC. L. REV. 47 (2009).
172
Id. at 89.
173
Cf. Blasius Indus., Inc., 564 A.2d at 651. However, as discussed above, Canada’s
statutory regime more effectively protects Canadian shareholders than does the United
States’.
171
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b. “All or Nothing” Proposal
Another proposal takes its inspiration from the U.K.’s requirement
that any listed firm’s shareholders each own either less than thirty
174
percent of a firm’s shares or one-hundred percent of them. This rule
would translate into an “all or nothing” takeover requirement:
175
“acquirers must buy 100[percent] or stay away.” Its proponent argues
that this option would not inhibit an active market for corporate control
but would ensure a “genuine democratic accountability of corporate
176
insiders.” Imposing accountability is important, as corporate insiders
have a strong presence in Canadian board rooms and shareholder
meetings, and undemocratic, dual-class share structures are relatively
177
common in Canada. Given the existing prevalence of institutional
shareholders in Canadian corporations, it is possible that this proposal
could have the beneficial results that its proponent claims. He adds a
caveat to his proposal: Canada should ensure the independence of the
boards of its institutional investors (specifically pension funds) from
178
corporate influence.
This proposal is not inconsistent with my proposal. The
proponent’s caveat is a positive development given the increasing
importance of pension funds and other institutional investors as
shareholders in Canadian corporations. The proposal itself is predicated
179
on creation of a national securities regulator, which requires action by
Canada’s Parliament. Enactment of such legislation would harmonize
Canadian securities regulation, and would provide an opportunity to
correct the too-broad public interest jurisdiction that provincial
securities commissions currently use to intervene in hostile takeover
situations.

174

Randall Morck, Shareholder Democracy in Canada 31, (Univ. of Alberta Sch. of
Business
Working
Paper,
2010),
available
at
http://www.business.ualberta.ca/RandallMorck/Research/~/media/University%20of%20Alb
erta/Faculties/Business/FacultyAndStaff/FSA/RandallMorck/Documents/Research/Working
Papers/2010_11_14_Shareholder_Democracy_in_Canada.pdf.
175
Id. at 32.
176
Id.
177
Telephone Interview with Sean Farrell, McMillan LLP (Apr. 19, 2011).
178
Morck, supra note 150, at 32.
179
Id. at 31.
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4. Concluding Remarks.
M&A activity is not always successful. Bids sometimes fail and
parties sometimes terminate deals. Companies’ post-merger
performance sometimes disappoints. Determining which transactions
are likely to disappoint and which are likely to create value for
shareholders demands a high level of business acumen. Corporate law is
built on the foundational principle that directors have this business
acumen, and has created a law of agents and principals to ensure that
director–agents exercise it in the best interest of the corporation and of
the shareholder–principals who own it. Shareholders have recourse to
the ballot box and to the courthouse where directors do not uphold their
duties under corporate law.
Where the directors do—i.e., where they take informed action with
good faith belief that the action is in the best interest of the
corporation—courts and securities regulators alike should respect their
decisions. It is not the place of the court or the securities regulator—just
as it is not the place of the shareholder—to manage the corporation and
decide the details of its business strategy. The decision to enter
transactions that risk these negative outcomes should be entered into
carefully and as part of a well-considered business strategy; by
corollary, a well-considered business strategy to remain independent is
one that should remain available to a board. Reflexively putting a
company in play as soon as a hostile bidder makes his first bear-hug
favours hostile bids and undermines that division of ownership and
management that is the foundation of our corporate law. Instead,
directors should be free—within the bounds of their fiduciary duties and
disciplined by the ballot box—to determine the company’s business
strategy.
a. Analysis of M&A Activity
Currently it is too easy to take over a Canadian corporation.
Canadian deals typically are “easier and less time-consuming to
180
accomplish” than comparable American deals. And, as in the United
States, studies of post-merger performance of Canadian acquirors
consistently reveal that mergers typically are not good for acquirors.
One study in 2004 examined the long-term performance of acquiror
securities in 267 consummated Canadian acquisitions that took place
180

Cf. Thomson et al., supra note 60, at A73.
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between 1980 and 2000. The study concluded that “Canadian acquirers
181
significantly underperform over the three-year post-event period”.
Additionally, a study of post-announcement stock performance in 2000
referred to, without challenging, studies of corporate earnings that
reveal a “declining average bidder firm performance during the two- to
182
five-year period following merger announcements.”
The Canadian regulatory environment renders corporations much
more vulnerable to these negative performance outcomes. Hostile bids
in Canada historically have had a higher success rate than hostile
American bids. In a 2004 comparative study, two Wharton School
professors determined that Canada’s success rate for hostile takeover
bids was approximately thirty-five percent between 1988 and 1998,
relative to a twenty-two percent success rate for such bids in the U.S.
183
during the same period. More recent data suggests that the Canadian
success rate continues to be higher relative to the United States. Since
1998, the success rate for hostile bids for an American target has been
approximately 27.6 percent. By contrast, the success rate for hostile bids
for a Canadian target has remained considerably higher, approximately
184
35.6 percent.
This success rate is equally applicable in non-hostile situations. In
the United States,
[a]lthough many corporate law scholars continue to obsess over the
few cases in which corporate boards were able to keep their
stockholders from accepting premium acquisition bids, the realities
of the marketplace and the pressure that case law put on directors to
act faithfully toward stockholders led to a huge increase in mergers
185
and acquisitions activity.
181
Jean-Francois L’Her, The long-run performance of mergers and acquisitions:
evidence from the Canadian stock market, 33 FIN. MGMT. 27, 27 (Dec. 22, 2004), available
at http://www.allbusiness.com/personal-finance/investing-stock-investments/294218-1.html.
182
B. Espen Eckbo & Karin S. Thornburn, Gains to Bidder Firms Revisited: Domestic
and Foreign Acquisitions in Canada, 35 J. OF FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 1, 1–2 (Mar. 2000).
183
William D. Schneper & Mauro F. Guillen, Stakeholder Rights and Corporate
Governance: A Cross-National Study of Hostile Takeovers, 49 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 263, 285
(“Table 1”) (2004). The study found that of 88 hostile attempts in Canada during the period,
30 succeeded; compared to 97 of 429 American attempts.
184
Bloomberg LP (MA Equity database search), accessed Apr. 22, 2011 (defining as
“hostile” those deals designated by Bloomberg as “hostile,” “unsolicited to hostile,” and
“friendly to hostile.”).
185
Leo E. Strine Jr., Human Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the Implications
of Globalization for the Effective Regulation of Corporate Behaviour, 58 U. TOR. L. J. 241,
260 (2008) (citing Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and

WILDGOOSE FORMATTED UPDATED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

340

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

6/28/2012 2:00 PM

Vol. 36:2

This statement is even more applicable to data regarding general
M&A activity in Canada. For example, of the 1,096 deals announced in
186
2010, only seventy-two were terminated (fifty of which had a
187
Canadian target). Though it is likely that many of these aborted deals
were hostile transactions (which account for a higher percentage of the
188
total number of aborted deals) , that total number of aborted deals
remains small as a percentage of all announced deals. These numbers
account for the anecdotally-repeated fact that hostile bids almost always
result in a transaction, either with the bidder or with a white knight. This
always-on-firesale state of corporate Canada in fact is bad for
shareholders, in light of the studies of post-merger performance.
b. Shareholders as Informed Corporate Citizens
Shareholders are not “suddenly wiser” in deciding how to vote in a
proxy battle presenting the same issue as is presented to shareholders in
evaluating a hostile bid. However, for the position of “director” to mean
something, and for the concept of fiduciary duties to mean anything,
there needs to be an at least symbolic protection of the directors’
decisions on behalf of the corporation. If shareholders decide that the
director’s decisions are not in the best interest of the corporation, then
they have options. Shareholders can sell their shares in the corporation
that that director manages; there is no right to a premium but there is a
public market for the shares. Or shareholders can vote that director out
of office; shareholders have a well-protected right to decide who
represents them.
Easy impeachment accomplishes the same constraining function
(market for corporate control constraint) as a tender offer, but there is
nothing about a tender offer that is so sacred that it should be protected
and excluded from the traditional division between shareholder and
Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 873–80 (2002)
and stating that the article “detail[s] the huge increase in mergers and acquisitions activity
during the period from 1980 to 2000.”).
186
M&A
Quarterly
Report – Q4/10,
CROSBIE
&
CO.
INC.,
http://www.crosbieco.com/ma/index.html.
187
E-mail from Yvonne Yip, PostMedia Network Inc., Apr. 5, 2011 (on file with
author).
188
Are
you
a
takeover
target?,
DELOITTE
&
TOUCHE LLP,
http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_CA/ca/insights/insights-andissues/3a9ca68c4d101210VgnVCM100000ba42f00aRCRD.htm (“hostile bids have a
termination rate of 56%, compared to 10% for friendly bids.”). The Baffinland bid and the
Lions Gate bid (discussed supra) and the BHP Billiton Ltd. bid all appear on the list.
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director responsibility. This division respects the role of the director in
making strategic decisions regarding the fate of the corporation—which
should include the strategic decision whether to remain independent.
Even if it is only symbolic and formalistic, directors should make that
decision. Directors can be impeached for taking that position, and
challengers can run on a platform of openness to unsolicited bids. In any
event, directors should not be constrained in exercising their fiduciary
duties by considerations imposed by a third-party administrative
tribunal purporting to defend shareholder interests, where the existing
statutory regime already protects those interests.

